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THEODORE EISENBERG,† TALIA FISHER†† & ISSI ROSEN-ZVI††† 
Attorneys’ fees fuel litigation, yet little is known about fees. Fee data are rarely 
available in the United States or in English rule, loser-pays jurisdictions. This 
Article analyzes fee awards in Israel, which vests judges with discretion to award 
fees, with loser pays operating as a norm. The 2641 cases studied constitute nearly 
all cases terminated by judgment in district courts in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
Given many fee denials and fees that are well below client payments to attorneys 
when awarded, the Israeli fee system could reasonably be characterized as being more 
American than English. Moreover, judges use their discretion in a manner that 
reflects redistributive sensitivity. Fees were awarded to prevailing parties in 72.8% 
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of cases. Judges often exercised their discretion to protect losing litigants, especially 
individuals, from having to pay fees. In tort cases won by individuals against 
corporate defendants, corporations paid their own fees plus plaintiffs’ fees in 99% of 
the cases; corporate defendants that prevailed in such cases paid their own fees 48% 
of the time. Asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants existed. In cases with fee 
awards, the mean and median fee paid to prevailing plaintiffs was 110,000 shekels 
(NIS) and 31,000 NIS, respectively; the mean and median fee paid to prevailing 
defendants was 49,000 NIS and 25,000 NIS, respectively. Plaintiffs prevailed in 
54.8% of cases between individuals but received 90% of the fees. Expected award 
amounts varied by case category and party status. Fees were significantly correlated 
with damages recoveries in plaintiff victories and with time on the docket. In 
contract and property cases, but not in tort cases, fees declined as a percent of 
recovery as the recovery increased.  
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*      *      * 
We are in deep mourning at the premature passing of Theodore Eisen-
berg, the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of 
Statistical Sciences at Cornell University Law School, who died after this 
Article was sent to the press. Ted was an eminent scholar and our greatly 
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changed legal discourse worldwide. In the last five years of his life, he 
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scholar, prolific writer, and passionate intellectual. But what we learned 
from Ted extends far beyond legal research. Ted represented to us exactly 
how one ought to live life. We were astounded by Ted's extraordinary 
kindness, the way he touched the lives of people, his endless wisdom, great 
optimism, and enormous zest for life. In the midst of the terrible grief we 
are now experiencing, we also feel profoundly privileged to have wonderful 
memories of Ted. We feel incredibly lucky to have gotten to know a person 
as outstanding and kind as Ted in our lifetime. This article is dedicated to 
his memory and to Ted’s wonderful family: Lisa, Kate, Aaron, Dylan, Ollie, 
Annie, and Tommy Eisenberg. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, it is appropriate to recall the core principle of these Rules “to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of cases.1 The litigation 
expense theme pervades the Rules,2 and the key litigation expense item is 
attorneys’ fees, although the Rules do not specify generally applicable fee 
rules. The Rules, like all of litigation, nevertheless operate in the shadow of 
methods for paying attorneys. However, except for isolated pockets of legal 
activity,3 little systematic knowledge exists of the fee patterns in the United 
States or other countries. In the United States, this is in part because the 
default American rule is that each party pays its own fees and fee amounts 
usually remain private. Most other countries follow the English rule, under 
which the losing party pays its opponents fees. In these countries, little 
quantitative study of fees exists.  
Despite this dearth of fee information, proposals to shift from the 
American rule to the English rule often emerge as a way to reduce expense 
and questionable litigation.4 The implications of such a shift for the opera-
tion of the Rules, and the entire litigation process, are substantial. It is 
therefore helpful to examine fees in a legal system, such as Israel’s, in which 
a loser-pays norm exists. The benefits of such an examination are at least 
fivefold. First, systematic knowledge about actual fee practices in any 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
2 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 16(f )(2), 23(g)-(h), 26(b)(2),(g), 41, 42, 54(d)(2), 58(e) & 68. 
3 These include automobile accident cases in the United Kingdom and class action settle-
ments, civil rights cases, and bankruptcy cases in the United States. See generally Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2010)]; Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2004)]; Paul Fenn & Neil 
Rickman, Fixing Lawyers’ Fees Ex Ante: A Case Study in Policy and Empirical Legal Studies, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 533 (2011); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants 
of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 
(2004); Stewart Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The 
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 
(1988). Early studies of fees are referred to in Herbert M. Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before 
1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925 (2009). 
4 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, When Courts Determine Fees in 
a System with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA 
L. REV. 1452, 1455 (2013) (stating that the difference in actual operation between the American 
and English rules is sufficiently blurred to call the dichotomy into question); Mathias Reimann, 
Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis (arguing that “[t]he world of cost and fee 
allocation in civil procedure is much better described as a broad spectrum” than a dichotomy), in 
COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3, 9 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012). 
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jurisdiction is rare despite fees’ obvious importance. Second, information 
about a loser-pays system’s operation informs the vast majority of countries 
since they use such systems. Third, since loser-pays proposals often are on 
the U.S. reform agenda, information from Israel can illuminate how such a 
system might operate in the United States. Fourth, within Israel, little 
systematic knowledge exists about how the attorneys’ fee system operates. 
The Israeli bar and policymakers should have a direct interest in such a 
study. Fifth, in Israel, judges have full discretion with regard to fee awards 
and denials. This judge-centered allocation system can serve as an alterna-
tive to both the American and English rules. Interest in how a judge-
centered system actually functions should transcend the countries using it. 
Its functioning should interest countries concerned about fees and how they 
might be reduced, made more certain or more flexible, or made fairer.  
This Article reports the results of a study of four years of attorney fee 
awards for nearly all district court cases litigated on the merits in Israel, a 
total of 2641 cases. Three outcomes are of primary interest: the patterns of 
fee grants and denials to winning and losing parties, the amount of fees 
when awarded, and the relation between the awarded fee and the client 
recovery in cases when plaintiffs prevailed and fees were awarded.  
To summarize our findings, Israeli judges often exercised their discre-
tion in a way that protects losing litigants, especially individuals. Israeli 
judges denied fees to prevailing defendants in 29% of cases and to prevailing 
plaintiffs in 26% of cases. In cases in which individual defendants lost, fees 
were denied to successful plaintiffs 31% of the time, compared with 17% 
denials in cases lost by corporate defendants. The fee denial rate to winning 
plaintiffs was lowest in tort cases and was highest for winning defendants in 
tort cases. Protection of individuals was common in tort cases between 
individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants. In non-automobile accident 
tort cases brought and won by individual plaintiffs, corporations had to pay 
their own fees plus the plaintiffs’ fees 99% of the time. In cases won by the 
corporate defendants, the defendants had to pay their own fees 48% of the 
time. In one judicial district, Nazareth, individual plaintiffs were denied 
fees in 82% of the property cases they won against individual defendants.  
The mean fee award to winning plaintiffs was 113,000 shekels (NIS) (1 
NIS equals approximately $0.27) compared to 49,000 NIS for winning 
defendants. The median fee award to winning plaintiffs was 35,000 NIS 
compared with 25,000 NIS for winning defendants. Excluding tort cases, in 
which contingency fees are the norm for plaintiffs, these differences de-
crease, with the winning plaintiff median equal to 26,000 NIS and the 
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winning defendant median equal to 25,000 NIS. Fee amounts were significantly 
correlated with recovery amounts and with the time a case took to resolve. 
Part I of this Article reviews relevant prior literature on fee rules and 
describes our expectations about the results. Part II provides background 
information about Israel’s legal system and its rules governing fees. Part III 
describes our study’s data and our research methodology. Part IV reports 
our results, which are discussed in Part V.  
A preliminary word on terminology may be helpful. Legal systems 
sometimes have different rules for amounts paid to attorneys (fees) and for 
other litigation expenses, which are often referred to as costs. We use the 
term “fees” for convenience, but the amounts we report are for the com-
bined amounts of fees and costs. 
I. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical literature on attorneys’ fees has been reviewed else-
where.5 That literature supplies few consistent predictions or prescriptions,6 
and we instead focus on prior empirical results.  
A. Rates of Fee Denials to Prevailing Parties 
With the exception of our prior work on a smaller two-year Israeli sample,7 
empirical literature does not addresses the quantitative pattern of fee awards 
and denials in the mass of civil cases. A core motivation behind allowing fee 
denials is the perceived negative effect of a loser-pays rule on potential 
litigants with lower incomes.8 Litigants’ status as individuals, corporations, 
 
5 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 334-39 (2013) 
(reviewing theories developed with respect to attorneys’ fees clauses).  
6 Id. at 339 (“Taken as a whole, the theoretical literature is indeterminate as to the practical 
effects and social utility of attorney-fee regimes.”).  
7 See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4. 
8 A loser-pays rule has been described as “a crude exclusion device the burden of which falls 
disproportionately on individuals and community groups which do not have the same deep pockets 
as governments and corporations.” Camille Cameron, The Price of Access to the Civil Courts in 
Australia: Old Problems, New Solutions: A Commercial Litigation Funding Study, in COST AND FEE 
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 59, 60 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (footnote omitted); see 
also Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 740-41 (2010) (stating that 
low- and middle-income individuals are often “barred from pursuing their rights” under the 
American rule). Limited litigation cost shifting may be superior to a full loser-pays system. See 
Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of the 
Loser-Pays Rule 13-14 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144800 (finding that the English rule is more 
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public corporations, or governmental entities can be a rough proxy for 
ability to pay. On average, corporations have a greater ability to pay than 
individuals. Public corporations, on average, likely have greater resources 
than private corporations or individuals. We therefore expect judges to 
protect individuals more than corporations from fee awards and to protect 
public corporations least of all. The government likely has greater ability to 
pay than almost all other litigants, but it also differs from other litigants in 
its financial incentives and in its litigation behavior.9 Therefore, we do not 
have a clear expectation about how judges will treat the government in 
allocating fees. 
Our prior work did not analyze data on amounts of fees or client recov-
eries. The probability of a fee denial may decrease as the level of damages 
awarded to plaintiffs increases. This is because damages are a measure of the 
degree of harm caused by the defendant, and it is reasonable to believe that 
the greater the harm caused, the greater the sentiment toward making the 
plaintiff more fully whole by awarding fees as well as damages. This conjec-
ture finds tangential support in U.S. punitive damages data. Although 
punitive damages are infrequently awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, a strong 
association exists between the amount of compensatory damages and the 
probability of a punitive damages award.10 At the highest end of compensa-
tory awards (those exceeding $10 million), the probability of a punitive 
damages award when the plaintiff won at trial and sought punitive damages 
was about 82%.11 Whether through punitive damages or awards of attorneys’ 
fees, decisionmakers may impose additional costs on defendants that cause 
more harm. 
The case category may also be associated with fee denial rates. Tort cases 
have two distinctive features that may influence judges to make successful 
tort plaintiffs whole by not denying them fees. First, tort plaintiffs usually 
are victims in an accident involving a party with whom they did not seek to 
deal. Unlike most contract and property interactions, little opportunity 
 
effective than the American rule at encouraging “socially valuable litigation,” in which legal 
uncertainties are resolved). 
9 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of 
the Case Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 95 (2003) (“Government litigants, who need 
not worry about profitable performance in the same manner as private litigants, and who operate 
in a different institutional structure, are likely to have costs, broadly defined, that differ from 
private litigants.”). 
10 Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T. Wells, The Decision to 
Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577, 617 (2010) (“Punitive 
damages were rarely sought in tried cases, were frequently awarded when requested, and were 
significantly associated with the level of the compensatory award.”). 
11 Id. at 599.  
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exists ex ante to avoid dealing with a counterparty. Second, tort plaintiffs 
are on average less well off than contract and property plaintiffs. District 
court plaintiffs in contract and property cases are usually people with 
means. Otherwise they would not be in district court litigating contracts 
worth more than 2.5 million NIS (the jurisdictional amount minimum)12 or 
fighting over the ownership of real property. Tort plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, are people who were injured badly (or they would not have filed their 
claim in district court) and not necessarily people with substantial assets. 
The institutional makeup of plaintiffs across case categories supports the 
contention that tort plaintiffs likely have less wealth. Our data revealed that 
about 85% of district court tort plaintiffs are individuals compared to 53% of 
contract plaintiffs and 75% of property plaintiffs. We expect the involun-
tary nature of tort transactions, the lesser wealth of tort plaintiffs, and the 
nature of their injury to leave judges more inclined to make successful tort 
plaintiffs whole.  
B. Levels of Fee Awards 
With respect to award amounts, we expect them to vary based on the 
time and effort in a case, the degree of success, and the plethora of factors 
that courts and the legislature consider relevant in assessing fees.13 A central 
determinant of fees should be the effort expended by the attorneys. The 
1983 Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP) reported the hours devoted 
by lawyers to cases in five federal courts and five state courts in the same 
locales for cases terminated in 1978.14 The data are based on interviews with 
 
12 See infra Section II.A. 
13 For Israel’s list of factors incorporated in the Rules of Civil Procedure and legal doctrine, 
see infra Section II.B. A frequently cited list of such factors in the United States is in Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing twelve factors for assessing 
the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees award), overruled in part by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 
87 (1989) (holding that the Johnson factors were useful but that an attorney’s private fee arrange-
ment was not a dispositive factor in determining whether a fee award was reasonable). In statutory 
fee-shifting cases, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus almost exclusively to reasonable hours 
worked times reasonable hourly fee. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1670, 
1672-73, 1676-77 (2010) (reversing 75% enhancement of attorney’s fees as essentially arbitrary, and 
holding that enhancements require specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been 
adequate to attract competent counsel); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1992) 
(giving unenhanced lodestar under fee-shifting environmental statutes). See generally 7B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1803-1803.2 (3d ed. 2005) (detailing the power courts have to award fees in class 
actions and under what circumstances). 
14 2 DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 
PART A at II-70, II-70 tbl.II-4-C (1983) [hereinafter CLRP] (“Cases with higher stakes tend to 
require and justify a greater investment of lawyer time.”). 
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719 lawyers in 564 separate cases.15 Cases with higher stakes required greater 
expenditures of time for both hourly and contingent fee lawyers.16 A similar 
relation was observed in United Kingdom automobile accident cases.17 
Additional reasons support expecting a positive correlation between client 
recoveries and attorneys’ fees. First, higher recoveries may be associated 
with attorneys’ relative performances in cases. Higher recoveries may reflect 
both greater success than lower recoveries and greater investment of time. A 
strong association between fees and client recovery has repeatedly been 
found in class action settlements, in which the court must approve the 
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.18 The increase in 
fee awards as recoveries increased was so regular in United Kingdom 
automobile accident cases that the empirically observed correlation became 
the basis for setting a mandatory fee schedule based on the recovery amount.19  
Second, from a psychological perspective, the presence of higher recoveries 
and damages in a case may have an anchoring effect. Exposure to larger 
numbers, whether relevant or not to the task at hand, can induce the 
production of higher numbers in many contexts.20 In the legal context, 
amounts of economic and noneconomic damages are highly correlated, as 
are amounts of punitive and compensatory damages.21 Whether or not 
 
15 Id. at II-12 (describing the study’s methodology). 
16 Id. at II-71, II-71 tbl.II-4-D (“The more complex a case, the more time lawyers are likely to 
spend on it.”). 
17 Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 549-52 (suggesting that Britain’s “Fixed Recoverable 
Cost Scheme” has “resulted in an increase of around 50 percent in the likelihood of litigation over 
noncost matters”). 
18 Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3, at 279 (“[The percentage fee method for awarding 
fees in class actions] appears to be the dominant de facto method used and best explains the 
pattern of awards.”); Eisenberg & Miller (2004), supra note 3, at 76 (“The single most important 
factor determining the fee is the size of the client’s recovery.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical 
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 845 
(2010) (finding that district courts typically calculate fee awards using the “highly discretionary 
percentage-of-the-settlement method,” and such awards “were strongly and inversely associated 
with the size of the settlement”).  
19 Britain adopted its “Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme for Low Value Road Traffic Acci-
dents” in response to concerns about increasing legal costs. Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 534 
(describing the Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme, which determines the costs available to 
successful lawyers in road traffic accident claims under £10,000).  
20 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative 
Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 143-45 (2011) (arguing that 
anchors have an impact on jury assessments of damages). 
21 See id. (finding that the amount of economic damage serves as a “guidepost for jurors” and 
that there is a “strong connection between compensatory and punitive damages”).  
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judges are less affected by anchoring than nonprofessionals, evidence exists 
of anchoring effects on judges.22 
The case category may also be associated with factors influencing fee 
awards. In the CLRP lawyer survey, there was no meaningful difference in 
the median hours spent by hourly lawyers across tort, contract, and property 
cases.23 But contingent-fee lawyers expended more than twice the median 
hours on tort cases than they expended on property cases,24 even though 
contingent-fee and hourly lawyers spent about the same amount of time on 
tort cases.25 Contingent fees are said to be as common in Israel as they are 
in the United States and to be primarily used in the same areas of law, 
mostly tort.26 Given the risk and extra hours associated with contingency 
fees, we might expect higher fees for plaintiffs in tort cases than in other 
cases. The standard contingency fee rate in Israel is 20%-25%, with 20% 
being the most common rate,27 which should influence the relationship 
between fee and recovery. Israeli law also has a specific rule relating to fees 
in automobile tort cases. The law caps the contingency fee at 13% of the 
recovery if the case reaches judgment.28 Therefore, one needs to account 
separately for automobile cases.  
Work by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) also helps 
inform expectations about fee award levels across case categories. Based on 
a 2012 survey of the American Board of Trial Advocates, the NCSC report-
ed fees of cases litigated to trial for several case categories.29 A definite 
hierarchy emerged. Median fees were highest in professional malpractice 
cases ($122,000), followed by contract cases, employment cases, real property 
 
22 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790-94 (2001) (outlining results of a study that demonstrate that judges 
were impacted by the presence of an anchor condition when evaluating damage awards).  
23 See CLRP, supra note 14, at II-70 tbl. II-4-C (showing approximately 30 hours for each 
area of law). 
24 See id. (finding that contingent fee lawyers spent a median of 30.3 hours on tort cases and 
12.5 hours on property cases). 
25 See id. (finding that contingent fee lawyers spend a median of 30.3 hours on tort cases and 
that hourly lawyers spent a median of 29.6 hours).  
26 See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys’ Contingent Fees: A Behav-
ioral Analysis, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 254 (2010) (“Contingent-fee arrangements are as prevalent 
in Israel as they are in the United States and are regularly used in the same areas of law.”).  
27 Id. at 255 n.10. 
28 Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 16 (1974–1975) (Isr.). 
29 See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Na’l Ctr. for State Courts, Estimating the 
Cost of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, Jan. 2013, at 1, 7, available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20
PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (showing cost of litigation by case type, such as automobile, employ-
ment, and malpractice).  
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cases, and premises liability cases.30 Median fees were lowest in automobile 
tort cases ($43,000).31 The NCSC data suggest that the specific area within 
tort law is a more important determinant of fees than the fact that a case is a 
tort case. Public corporations, private corporations, and individuals likely 
have differing capacities to pay fees. Their relative wealth might influence 
both the level of fee awards and whether fees are awarded.  
C. Fees as a Percent of Recovery 
A separate question from the relationship between the amount of client 
recovery and the fee amount is the issue of the fee as a percentage of the 
recovery. The recovery amount to fee amount relationship could be a 
constant percentage, similar to the oversimplified description of the one-
third contingency fee in U.S. tort law. But the fee as a percentage of the 
recovery might also increase or decrease as the recovery grows. An increas-
ing percentage gives the lawyer a stronger incentive to obtain the marginal 
recovery dollar. A decreasing percentage introduces an economy of scale, 
which is especially relevant, and frequently observed,32 in aggregate litiga-
tion such as class actions. The Israel Bar Association’s suggested minimum 
tariff rates recommend a declining percentage as claims amounts increase.33  
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAEL’S LEGAL SYSTEM 
Understanding Israel’s relevant institutional framework is necessary to 
comprehend this study. This Article focuses on fees at the trial court level in 
Israel’s district courts, and thus we limit the institutional description of 
Israel’s court system to those aspects that are most relevant to this study. We 
then describe Israel’s rules on the allocation of fees. 
A. Israel’s Trial Court System 
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of courts of general jurisdic-
tion.34 Among the courts of general jurisdiction, Israel’s judiciary law 
establishes a hierarchy of three levels with the Israel Supreme Court (ISC) 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3 (showing that, due to scaling effects, fees 
as a percent of recovery decrease as the recovery amount increases). 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 66-68.  
34 Unless otherwise noted, this description of the Israeli judiciary is based on Eisenberg, 
Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4. 
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at the top, district courts below it, and magistrates’ courts at the bottom.35 
District courts and magistrates’ courts function as trial courts, while the 
ISC functions both as an appellate court and as the High Court of Justice 
(HCJ).36 In its HCJ capacity, the court operates as a court of first and last 
instance, primarily in areas relating to government behavior.37 
Twenty-nine magistrates’ courts operate as Israel’s basic trial courts and 
serve the locality and district in which they sit. They have civil jurisdiction 
over matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—currently 2.5 
million NIS—as well as over the use, possession, and division of real 
property.38 District courts have residual jurisdiction over matters not within 
the sole jurisdiction of another court. The six district courts sit in Jerusalem, 
Tel Aviv, Haifa, Be’er-Sheva, Nazareth, and Petah Tikva (since 2012, in 
Lod).39 District courts have civil jurisdiction over matters with more than 
2.5 million NIS in dispute and commonly adjudicate cases involving 
business companies and partnerships, arbitration, and prisoner petitions. 
District courts also serve as administrative law courts.40 Generally, a single 
district court judge presides over trial.41 This study is limited to cases 
originating in the district courts. 
Court filing fees in Israel can be much more substantial than in the 
United States.42 Higher fees, which impose higher ex ante litigation costs, 
 
35 See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) (Isr.) 
(outlining civil law procedure regulations). 
36 See Menachem Hofnung & Keren Weinshall-Margel, Judicial Setbacks, Material Gains: 
Terror Litigation at the Israeli High Court of Justice, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 664, 669 (2010) 
(noting that the HCJ’s “original and final” jurisdiction in matters beyond the jurisdiction of other 
courts paves the way for litigation between the public and policymakers). 
37 Id. at 669-70 (noting the court’s jurisdiction over “petitions concerning national security 
where the respondents are almost always cabinet ministers, agencies entrusted with security 
powers, or the Israeli army”).  
38 Magistrates’ courts also serve as traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small 
claims courts. Generally, a single judge presides over each case unless the President of the 
Magistrates’ Court directs that a panel of three judges should hear a particular case. See generally 
Courts Law (Consolidated Version), supra note 35, § 47. 
39 The Petah-Tikva court was established in 2007 and moved to Lod in 2012. Ordinances of 
Courts (Establishment of The Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824 (Isr.). 
40 District courts also hear appeals from judgments of the magistrates’ courts.  
41 A panel of three judges hears appeals from magistrates’ court judgments and also sits when 
the President or Deputy President of the District Court so directs. See Courts Law (Consolidated 
Version), supra note 35, § 37. Our data do not include any cases with a three-judge panel.  
42 Civil case filing fees in the United States tend to be relatively small. The filing fee to 
commence a civil action in federal court is $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012). For a list of state 
court filing fees, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL 
COURTS, APRIL, 2012, http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/ 
~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/ 
Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20April%202012.ashx.  
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likely exert greater influence over the nature of cases that are filed in court 
than do fees in the United States. Filing fees for monetary claims in Israeli 
general civil courts are 2.5% of the value of the relief sought, including a 
minimum fee that is currently 758 NIS, approximately 217 U.S. dollars. For 
claims over 24,235,382 NIS, the filing fee percent declines to 1% of the 
claim.43 Thus, filing fees in monetary damages cases can be several thousand 
dollars. Filing fees in nonmonetary relief cases—such as suits for declarato-
ry relief, contempt of court, or derivative suits—as well as in personal injury 
suits, are fixed by the Court Rules (Court Fees) of 2007 and are updated 
from time to time.44 Several exceptions to the requirement to pay filing fees 
exist and are based either on a litigant’s financial hardship or on the nature of 
the claim filed. For example, courts will exempt plaintiffs in full or in part 
on a showing of financial inability to pay the fee.45 Courts apply this 
exemption narrowly, however, and an applicant for relief must demonstrate 
not only inadequate personal financial resources, but also the unavailability 
of financial assistance from other sources, such as family members.46 
Exemptions from, or reductions of, filing fees based on the nature of the 
claim filed include such cases as prisoner petitions, government takings and 
many others.47 
B. Israel’s Law on Attorneys’ Fees 
Israeli law governing fees differs from that of most countries except 
South Africa and, to some extent, India,48 in that allocation decisions are 
left almost entirely to the court’s discretion.49 The rules regulating attorneys’ 
fees50 are specified in the 1984 Rules of Civil Procedure (RCP).51 The 
 
43 Second Supplement of the Court Rules (Court Fees), 2007, § 8 (Isr.). 
44 See id. at § 2 (filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in magistrates’ court is 6592 NIS); id. 
at § 3 (filing fee for declaratory relief cases filed in magistrates’ court is 633 NIS); id. at § 9 (filing 
fee for bodily injury cases filed in district court is 41,203 NIS); id. at § 10 (filing fee for declaratory 
relief cases filed in district court is 1115 NIS). Specialized courts and tribunals—such as family 
courts, labor courts, small claims courts, and the like—are governed by special rules with respect to 
filing fees. 
45 See id. § 14. 
46 See TA 511/98 Fuks v. Discount Bank LTD (unpublished, June 9, 1999) (Isr.); BS 494/95 
Shimoni v. Shimoni (unpublished, Mar. 23, 1995) (Isr.). 
47 See Second Supplement of the Court Rules §§ 3, 9 & 20. 
48 See generally Reimann, supra note 4 (undertaking a comparative view of litigation costs, 
particularly for attorneys involved in “transboundary cases”). 
49 Although there are several supreme court cases, discussed below, that purport to guide the 
judges to use certain criteria in awarding fees, district courts mentioned such guiding cases in less 
than three percent of our sample. 
50 Although the Rules of Civil Procedure treat court costs and attorneys’ fees jointly using 
the term “expenses,” the supreme court has urged judges to rule separately on court costs and 
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fundamental litigation fee allocation rule, Rule 511, grants courts wide 
discretion concerning whether to award fees and the amount awarded and 
subjects this discretion to a limited set of guidelines prescribed in Rule 512. 
Israel does not have a developed market for insurance to protect against 
attorneys’ fees a party may have to pay in litigation.  
The rules instruct courts to base their fee rulings on, among other 
things, the amount or value of the relief asked for by the plaintiff and the 
remedy granted by the court. They also authorize the courts to consider the 
parties’ behavior during trial. Although not mandated by law, judges in 
practice usually follow the loser-pays rule.52 Judges can, and sometimes do, 
order winning parties to pay losing parties’ fees.53 In terms of the amounts 
awarded, many believe that a transformation has taken place over time. 
Historically, courts tended to disregard completely the actual amounts 
expended by winning parties, leading, in all likelihood, to undercompensa-
tion.54 In recent years, following the “constitutional revolution,”55 which 
constitutionalized to a certain extent civil procedure, both those within and 
without the judicial system have increasingly argued that fees awarded 
should be more in line with parties’ actual fees.56 
 
attorneys’ fees, because one must add value-added tax (VAT) to attorneys’ fees, which should not 
be included in the amount payable as court costs. See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh 
Atid Lebiyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.). It should be noted, however, that not all judges follow 
the Supreme Court’s recommendation. In cases in which fees were denied, the prevailing party 
received neither costs nor fees. 
51 See generally Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984, KT 4685, 2220 (Isr.). 
52 See URI GOREN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ISSUES 721-22 (11th ed. 2013). 
53 See, e.g., CA (Jer) 35178-09-12 Morgenstern v. Drinking Bottles Collection Corp. 1, 15 
(unpublished 2013) (Isr.). 
54 This is our impression of the prevalent supposition in the legal community. See also 
LOVELLS, AT WHAT COST? A LOVELLS MULTI JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION 
COSTS 110-11, http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/c940bb4b-a67f-4e63-a5b8-
ced6198b2125/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fff33267-29d5-4230-a140-cf2eeb7d4a05/ 
LitigationCostsReport.pdf (displaying results of a study of 50 jurisdictions and their associated 
costs, including recoverability of costs and interest on costs). 
55 See Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the 
Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REV. 299, 310 (2003–2004) (“The 
enactment of the 1992 basic laws [Basic Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation] underlies the claim that Israel has undergone a ‘constitutional revolution,’ transforming 
it from a parliament-supremacy type democracy (similar to the UK) to a constitutional democracy 
(like most other Western democracies) where human rights serve as powerful ‘trumps.’”). 
56 See SHLOMO LEVIN, THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION AND 
BASIC PRINCIPLES (2008). 
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A 2005 Israel Supreme Court (ISC) Registrar57 decision, though not 
binding, instructed judges to award winning parties their actual fees unless 
the award would unreasonably impair access to justice and equality or cause 
over-deterrence.58 A subsequent ISC decision explained that awarding the 
winning party its actual fees is intended to prevent financial loss by the 
winning party, to deter potential plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims, and 
to discourage potential defendants from defending against a rightful suit.59 
However, the court continued that the actual fees must be subject to them 
being “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the litigation.”60 This 
limitation is intended to avoid over-deterrence, prevent inequality between 
rich and poor parties, inhibit inappropriate increases in the cost of litiga-
tion, and foster access to justice.61  
Another ISC decision specified some of the factors judges should con-
sider when awarding fees: the character of the suit and its complexity, the 
requested relief and its proportionality to the relief actually granted, the 
amount of work invested by the award recipient in the litigation, the actual 
amount paid or payable as attorneys’ fees, and the behavior of the request-
ing party during the litigation.62  
Notwithstanding these decisions, it is clear to those acquainted with Is-
raeli civil litigation that fee awards do not reflect the parties’ actual expendi-
tures during the litigation in the majority of the cases.63 This is in part 
because courts do not know what the parties’ actual fees were. Parties 
requesting an award of fees are not required to, and rarely do, introduce 
evidence of the actual amounts they had to expend on the litigation.64 In 
 
57 The ISC Registrar is a magistrate court judge who sits at the ISC and handles certain 
procedural issues, such as requests for filing fee exemptions, petitions to join parties, and questions 
of appellate jurisdiction. 
58 See HCJ 891/05 Tnuva Cent. Coop. for the Mktg. of Agric. Produce in Isr. Ltd. v. The 
Auth. for the Licensing of Imports 1, 5 [2005] (Isr.). 
59 See CA 6793/08 Loare Ltd. v. Meshulam Levinshtein Contracting & Eng’g Ltd. 1, 12 
[2009] (Isr.). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh Atid Lebiyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.). 
63 See LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110-11 (providing questions and answers on the topic of fee 
recovery in Israel). 
64 In 2002, the ISC’s president, Justice Aharon Barak, issued administrative guidance regarding 
the award of attorneys’ fees. According to the guidance, judges, when calculating attorneys’ fees, 
are allowed to take into account the written retainer agreement between the party and her attorney 
that was introduced into evidence by the attorney during trial or as an annex to the written 
summations. The second part of the guidance qualifies this instruction by stating that attorneys are 
by no means obligated to introduce retainer agreements into evidence nor are courts obligated to 
take them into account when calculating fee awards. See SUPREME COURT ISR., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE GUIDANCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 1/98, CALCULATING 
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our data, a fee agreement with a client was submitted in only four cases.65 
These common practices seem to limit implementing the more recent 
emphasis on awarding actual fees to parties. 
The Israel Bar Association has a schedule of recommended, but not 
binding, minimum tariffs. For monetary claims in courts, the recommended 
minimum starts at 15% of the claim amount.66 For claims above 91,140 NIS 
up to 895,630 NIS, the recommendation is 10% of 91,140 NIS plus 4% of the 
claim amount above 91,140 NIS.67 For claims above 895,630, the amount is 
as agreed between attorney and client but not less than 41,690 NIS.68 For 
tort claims with contingent fees, other than road accidents, the recommend-
ed minimum starts at 15% of the recovery and has a top rate of 10% of the 
adjudicated amount for recoveries above 342,650 NIS.69 For roadway 
accidents, the Compensation for Victims of Road Accidents Law imposes a 
maximum fee of 13% of the amount awarded by judgment.70 
In summary, the RCP and other guidance provided to Israeli judges em-
body considerations similar to those in theoretical discussions of optimal 
litigation cost allocation rules—considerations such as avoiding financial loss 
to prevailing parties, deterring frivolous litigation, promoting defendant 
 
ATTORNEY FEES (2002). In 2010, Justice Barak’s successor, President Justice Dorit Beinish, 
issued an amendment to the administrative guidance:  
[A]s a general rule, the attorney fees to be awarded should approximate the actual 
costs expended on the litigation, subject to their being reasonable, proportional and 
necessary under the circumstances. In this regard, each party is allowed to intro-
duce . . . the written retainer agreement between that party and her attorney, as 
well as proof of any money paid as attorney fees.  
SUPREME COURT ISR., GUIDELINES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(2010), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/dover/html/hanchayot_new.pdf. The second part 
of the Barak administrative guidance remained in place, however. See id.  
65 This is consistent with conversations we held with numerous attorneys and judges suggesting 
that, in practice, retainer agreements are rarely introduced into evidence. 
66 ISRAEL BAR ASS’N, BAR ASSOCIATION RULES (RECOMMENDED MINIMUM TARIFF) 
2000, available at www.israelbar.org.il/uploadFiles/ 
Bar_Association_Rules_(Recommended_Minimum_Tariff)_english_nov_2008.pdf. Amounts are 
to be adjusted for inflation. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 16 (1974–1975) 
(Isr.); see also LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110 (“[T]he Bar Association Regulations determine the 
maximum fee rates in motor vehicle accident claims . . . [such as] 13% of  [the] amount awarded by 
judgment.”).  
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reasonableness, promoting fair access to the justice system, avoiding over 
deterrence, and making awards correspond to effort expended.71  
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Data and Methodolog y 
The data used here consist of civil cases filed under the original jurisdic-
tion of the five district courts that existed in Israel in 2005 and 2006, and 
the six district courts that existed in 2011 and 2012.72 We included only civil 
cases that reached final decisions on the merits. The study includes every 
case decided in the four years for which an opinion was available online via 
the Dinim website.73 Dinim is a private company that offers attorneys and 
other paying clients access to case information. Using the Dinim database 
led us to focus our inquiry on 2005 and 2006 because these are the first two 
years for which the database is supposedly comprehensive regarding district 
court decisions.74 Prior to those years, we could not be sure that the selec-
tion of cases by Dinim did not generate selection bias. The more recent 
years substantially increase the sample size and allow us to assess change 
over time. Our sample consists of 2641 cases. 
We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the Dinim database by 
comparing it with data obtained from Israel’s official court system website 
Net Hamishpat.75 Although Net Hamishpat does not provide information 
relating to all district courts operating in 2005 and 2006, the partial data 
that it does provide suggest that the data obtained from the Dinim website 
are indeed comprehensive and accurate. The data thus provide a complete 
picture of district court civil case activity in the periods covered and a sound 
basis for assessing how the courts rule with respect to fees in civil cases. 
The data are subject to some limitations. First, the study covers only 
final decisions in civil matters, thus omitting cases terminated via settle-
ment, dismissal, or judgment by way of settlement under § 79A of the 
 
71 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees (discussing “whether a move to fuller 
indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of litigation . . . [or] better align those costs 
with any social benefits they might generate”), in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 64-65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000). 
72 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (referring to the 2007 establishment of the Petah 
Tikva court).  
73 DINIM, http://www.dinimveod.co.il (last visited May 12, 2014). 
74 Telephone interview with Adv. Michal Vinograd, General Manager, Dinim (June 2011). 
75 NET HAMISHPAT, https://www.court.gov.il/NGCS.Web.Site/HomePage.aspx (last visited 
May 12, 2014). 
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Courts’ Act.76 Second, the study excludes interlocutory decisions. This 
exclusion is significant because often judges award fees to parties who 
prevail in interlocutory decisions and, therefore, looking only at final 
decisions provides a partial picture of fees awarded in tried cases. Third, the 
study includes only district court cases and excludes magistrates’ courts, 
ISC cases, and cases from specialized courts such as family courts, rabbinical 
courts, labor courts, and military courts.  
Student research assistants coded cases, which were randomly sampled 
for accuracy by a second tier of more experienced students. Prior to the 
student coding, the Authors designed a data form to structure the coding. 
The performance of the form and the students were reviewed in an initial 
set of cases, the form was revised in light of that experience, and a final 
form was constructed. The students used that revised form to code the cases 
under the supervision of the Authors.  
B. Descriptive Statistics 
To explore the relations among the outcomes of interest—denials of fee 
awards, amount of fee awards, and the relation between recoveries and fee 
awards—we account for several factors about the cases and the parties. Case 
characteristics include the case category, the recovery amount in cases won 
by plaintiffs, time on the docket, whether the parties had counsel, and the 
court that adjudicated the case. For case categories, we used the first claim 
in a case to characterize the case as one of ten civil case categories. For 
parties, we coded for whether plaintiffs and defendants were individuals, 
corporations, or government entities, as well as the ethnicity of individual 
litigants as Arab or Jewish. We used the first named plaintiff and defendant 
to code party status. For time on the docket, we used docket numbers to 
estimate the date of filing. Since the district court docket numbering system 
changed during the years studied, we used different estimation methods to 
exploit the information embodied in the varying docket number systems.77  
 
76 See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, §79A (1983-1984) (Isr.) 
(outlining civil law procedure regulations). 
77 For newer style document numbers, we used the year a case was filed and determined the 
month a case was filed from its docket number, which includes the month of filing. We estimated 
the date of filing using the order and the number of filings in a district in a month. This method 
was used for 633 cases. For earlier style docket numbers, which do not include the month of filing, 
we estimated the date of filing by using the docket numbers, which are sequential within each 
district and year. We thus know the order in which the cases were filed but not the exact date. For 
years in which the number of civil filings was known, we estimated the date of filing using the 
order and number of filings in a district in a year. To illustrate, if the data included one case filed 
in a district in a year, we assigned it a mid-year filing date. If the data included two cases filed in a 
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In 5.1% of the cases, a fee was or may have been awarded to a losing party. 
These cases fall into three categories. The first consists of cases in which the 
winning party’s misbehavior led the court to award the losing party fees.78 
The second includes cases involving multiple parties with the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs having succeeded as to some defendants but not as to other 
defendants. Since we analyzed the data at the case level rather than the 
individual litigant level, some of these cases may be ones that should be 
counted as following a loser-pays rule, but they also may be ones in which a 
losing party received a fee. The third contains cases in which it is not clear-
cut who the winning party actually was. These are cases in which the court 
accepted the winning party’s claims only in (sometimes small) part. It is not 
clear whether in such cases courts should be characterized as not applying a 
loser-pays rule. By characterizing the second and third categories of cases as 
ones in which a loser may have received a fee, we slightly understate the rate 
at which the loser-pays rule was applied. That leaves us with unambiguous 
outcomes of loser pays or no one pays for 95% of the cases. We leave further 
analysis of the 5.1% of the cases with possible payments to losing parties for 
future work. For purposes of summarizing fee amounts, we exclude the 
2.95% of cases in which no defense was offered on the merits and report 
summary statistics that exclude cases with no fee awards to the prevailing 
party and cases in which the losing party may have received a fee.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. The 
table shows the number (via the mean value of the case category variables) 
of cases in each category. About 84% of the sample consists of three major 
civil case categories, coded as contract, property, and tort (including auto-
mobile cases). These and most other case categories involve the kinds of 
cases brought in most legal systems, but some reflect distinctive features of 
Israeli law.  
Since 2000, most cases that deal with administrative law are under the 
jurisdiction of either Israel’s specialized administrative courts or the ISC in 
its HCJ capacity. Our sample does not include ISC or HCJ cases. Regular 
 
district in a year, we assigned the first case a filing date one-third into the year and the second case 
a filing date two-thirds into the year. If the data included fifty cases filed in a district in a year, we 
assigned equally spaced filing dates, beginning with the seventh day of the year (365/50, rounded) 
as the first filing date. This method was used in 1121 cases. For years in which the number of civil 
filings was not known, we estimated the date of filing using the order and number of filings in the 
cases in our data in a district in a year. This method was used in 859 cases. For 11 cases filed and 
terminated in the same year, the estimation of the day of case filing yielded negative time on the 
docket. In those cases, the time on the docket was replaced by the mean time on the docket for the 
145 cases in our data that had positive time estimates and were filed and terminated in the same 
year (0.33 years). The data contained the date of termination so no estimation of that date was needed. 
78 For an example of such a case, see supra note 53. 
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civil courts, including district courts, have residual administrative law 
jurisdiction and deal mostly with restitution claims in administrative 
matters. These claims are a small minority of cases on the administrative docket.  
With respect to arbitration cases, the Arbitration Act of 1968 allows the 
parties to arbitration to resort to court during the arbitration process or 
following its conclusion. During the arbitration, the court has the power to 
intervene in various procedural aspects of the arbitration.79 But the most 
significant and prevalent jurisdiction of courts is to invalidate a final 
arbitration decision for reasons specified in the Arbitration Act.80  
Expropriation cases involve government condemnation of property and 
the usual structure of the case is for an individual or corporation to sue a 
government to contest the matter. This party structure accounts for about 
87% of the expropriation cases. Nonmonetary relief was sought in 50.8% of 
the cases, which helps account for the number of cases in which a recovery 
amount and fee percent were not observed.  
Distribution of case categories varied between districts. Contract cases 
dominated in Tel Aviv (comprising 37% of the docket), tort cases (including 
auto cases) dominated in Jerusalem (comprising 35% of the docket), and 
property cases dominated in Nazareth and Petah Tikva (comprising 58% 
and 35% of the docket, respectively). In Haifa, tort and property cases each 
accounted for about 33% of the docket. Cases were most evenly distributed 
across the major case categories in Be’er-Sheva, where the major categories 
ranged from about 25% to 28% of the docket.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Outcomes       
 Fee denied to 
winner 
2528 0.272 0 0.445 0 1 
 Fee amount 1167 83,144 30,000 216,740 1017 4,000,000 
 Fee as percent of 
recovery 
307 19.5 13.1 28.5 0.8 250.3 
 Recovery amount  731 1,806,317 872,488 2,841,958 1498.2 35,800,000 
 Plaintiff won 2641 0.611 0 0.488 0 1` 
 Plaintiff prevailed 
in whole 
2641 0.329 0 0.470 0 1` 
Case  cha ra c t e r i s t i c s        
 Admin. Law 2641 0.017 0 0.131 0 1 
 Arbitration 2641 0.025 0 0.155 0 1 
 
79 Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, 22 LSI 210, § 16 (1967–1968) (Isr.) (outlining potential action a 
court may take during an arbitration). 
80 See id. § 24 (listing ten bases for setting aside or modifying an arbitration award). 
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 Banking 2641 0.020 0 0.142 0 1 
 Contract 2641 0.272 0 0.445 0 1 
 Corporations 2641 0.038 0 0.192 0 1 
 Expropriation 2641 0.017 0 0.131 0 1 
 Other 2641 0.045 0 0.207 0 1 
 Property 2641 0.298 0 0.457 0 1 
 Tort 2641 0.174 0 0.379 0 1 
 Tort, auto 2641 0.093 0 0.290 0 1 
 Years on docket 2613 4.08 3.78 2.76 0.003 22.8 
 Pltf. Represented 2637 0.937 1 0.242 0 1 
 Deft. Represented 2639 0.823 1 0.382 0 1 
Plaintiff–Defendant characteristics     
 Ind. v. Ind. 2638 0.329 0 0.470 0 1 
 Ind. v. Corp. 2638 0.246 0 0.431 0 1 
 Ind. v. Govt. 2638 0.110 0 0.312 0 1 
 Corp. v. Ind. 2638 0.079 0 0.270 0 1 
 Corp. v. Corp. 2638 0.139 0 0.347 0 1 
 Corp. v. Govt. 2638 0.055 0 0.229 0 1 
 Govt. v. Ind. 2638 0.022 0 0.147 0 1 
 Govt. v. Corp. 2638 0.014 0 0.116 0 1 
 Govt. v. Govt. 2638 0.006 0 0.075 0 1 
 Public corp. pltf. 2641 0.044 0 0.205 0 1 
 Public corp. deft. 2641 0.101 0 0.302 0 1 
 Foreign corp. pltf. 2641 0.032 0 0.176 0 1 
 Foreign corp. deft. 2641 0.011 0 0.106 0 1 
District       
 Be’er-Sheva 2641 0.054 0 0.226 0 1 
 Haifa 2641 0.298 0 0.458 0 1 
 Jerusalem 2641 0.133 0 0.339 0 1 
 Nazareth 2641 0.091 0 0.287 0 1 
 Petah Tikva 2641 0.070 0 0.255 0 1 
 Tel Aviv 2641 0.354 0 0.478 0 1 
Year case ended       
 2005 2641 0.223 0 0.417 0 1 
 2006 2641 0.209 0 0.406 0 1 
 2011 2641 0.304 0 0.460 0 1 
 2012 2641 0.264 0 0.441 0 1 
Note: Fee amount and fee percent include cases in which the winning party was awarded fees in 
which a defense was offered. Fee percent includes only cases with nonzero fee awards and nonzero 
recovery amounts. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.  
IV. RESULTS 
We first report results for denials of fee awards and then report results 
for the amount of fees, conditional on the award of fees. Accounting for 
which party prevailed at trial is important because fee denial rates are 
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highly correlated with whether plaintiffs or defendants win.81 Where 
relevant, we therefore present results stratified by the winning party.  
A. Denials of Fee Awards 
Table 2 shows substantial asymmetries in the rates of fee denials to win-
ning parties. Of the three large case categories, contract and tort cases had 
higher rates of fee denial in cases where defendants won than in cases where 
plaintiffs won. The difference in tort cases is striking, with fee denials to 
winning defendants in 40% of the cases and fee denials to winning plaintiffs 
in only 9% of the cases. The pattern is similar in the largest subcategory of 
tort cases, automobile cases. In property cases, the difference reverses, with 
winning plaintiffs denied fees at a higher rate than winning defendants. 
Automobile cases also have a noticeably different win rate, in which defend-
ants won only 11% of adjudicated cases due to the no-fault regime that 
governs such cases. The 89% success rate for plaintiffs is due to their having 
to prove damages rather than liability. In such cases, even if the plaintiff 
receives much lower damages than requested, it is coded in our data as a win 
for the plaintiff.82  
 
Table 2: Rate of Fee Denial by Case Category and Prevailing Party 
 Defendant won Plaintiff won Total 
cases 
Category 
Number 
won 
% 
won 
Proportion 
of fee 
denials of 
cases won 
Number 
won % won
Proportion 
of fee denials 
of cases won  
Admin. Law 25 54.4 0.32 21 45.6 0.33 46 
Arbitration 32 49.2 0.13 33 50.8 0.45 65 
Banking  28 51.9 0.04 26 48.2 0.24 54 
Contract 310 43.1 0.30 409 56.9 0.24 719 
Corporations 42 41.6 0.24 59 58.4 0.40 91 
Expropriation 17 37.0 0.36 29 63.0 0.24 46 
Property 271 34.5 0.25 515 65.5 0.42 786 
Tort  224 48.7 0.40 236 51.3 0.09 460 
  
 
81 Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4, at 1473-79. 
82 Some automobile cases involve a dispute about whether the claim involves an “automobile 
accident” as defined by the Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 1 
(1974–1975) (Isr.).  
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Tort, auto 27 11.0 0.41 218 89.0 0.06 245 
Other  52 43.7 0.25 67 56.3 0.33 119 
Total  1028 38.9 0.29 1613 61.1 0.26 2641 
Note: The numbers of observations for the “Proportion of fee denials” columns are fewer than the 
numbers shown in the table due to a small portion of the cases in which fee outcomes could not be 
definitively ascertained.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
Table 3 reports rates of fee denial by year and judicial district. Petah 
Tikva and Tel Aviv consistently denied fee awards more frequently to 
winning defendants than to winning plaintiffs. Nazareth, with its large 
proportion of property cases, consistently denied fee awards more frequent-
ly to winning plaintiffs than to winning defendants. Nazareth judges denied 
fees to plaintiffs in 68% of the property cases they won, with even higher 
denial rates in cases between individuals. They denied fees to prevailing 
defendants in only 16% of cases. In other districts, denial rates to prevailing 
property case plaintiffs did not exceed 40%, and fee denial rates to prevail-
ing defendants were all higher than in Nazareth. The other three districts 
did not have a consistent pattern favoring plaintiffs or defendants. Change 
in category mix does not appear to explain the changes. The difference 
between fee denial rates in defendant wins was not statistically significant. 
The differences in rates of fee denials in plaintiff wins did significantly 
differ, with Nazareth as the source of the difference. Excluding Nazareth, 
results for plaintiffs did not significantly differ by district (p=0.148). Over 
the four years of the study, rates of fee award denials did not significantly 
differ for plaintiff wins (p=0.169) or for defendant wins (p=0.316). 
 
Table 3: Rate of Fee Denial by Judicial District, Prevailing Party, and Year 
Judicial 
District 
Year of 
decision 
Rate when 
defendant 
won 
Rate 
when 
plaintiff 
won 
Judicial 
District 
Year of 
decision
Rate when 
defendant 
won 
Rate 
when 
plaintiff 
won 
Be’er-Sheva 2005 0.36 0.29 Nazareth 2005 0.28 0.55 
Be’er-Sheva 2006 0.40 0.17 Nazareth 2006 0.31 0.69 
Be’er-Sheva 2011 0.18 0.32 Nazareth 2011 0.11 0.46 
Be’er-Sheva 2012 0.15 0.26 Nazareth 2012 0.27 0.57 
Haifa 2005 0.47 0.14 Petah 
Tikva 
2005 - - 
Haifa 2006 0.18 0.27 Petah 
Tikva 
2006 - - 
Haifa 2011 0.33 0.35 Petah 
Tikva 
2011 0.31 0.19 
Haifa 2012 0.16 0.35 Petah 
Tikva 
2012 0.22 0.18 
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Jerusalem 2005 0.34 0.15 Tel Aviv 2005 0.31 0.19 
Jerusalem 2006 0.41 0.10 Tel Aviv 2006 0.28 0.17 
Jerusalem 2011 0.25 0.29 Tel Aviv 2011 0.28 0.21 
Jerusalem 2012 0.38 0.28 Tel Aviv 2012 0.34 0.20 
Significance       0.780 <0.001 
Note: The Petah Tikva district court was created in 2007. The significance levels in the table test 
for differences across districts, pool the data across years within districts, and account for the non-
independence of decisions by the same judge.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
Because multiple factors may be associated with fee denials, regression 
analysis helps assess whether the above results persist when explanatory 
factors are taken into account simultaneously. Since the outcome variable 
“fee denial” is dichotomous, we employ logistic regression.83 Tables 2 and 3 
indicate that the prevailing party, case category, and district are all associat-
ed with fee denials. In the regression models, we add further controls for 
plaintiff–defendant status (including public corporate status and foreign or 
domestic status), the size of the recovery in cases won by plaintiffs, the time 
a case took to resolve, and representation by counsel.84 Since RCP Rule 512 
instructs courts to base their litigation cost rulings in part on the amount or 
value of the relief requested and the remedy granted by the court, we also 
included a variable for whether a plaintiff prevailed in whole or in part. 
Table 1 shows that the government was the plaintiff in relatively few cases. 
We therefore combined the government-plaintiff categories into a single 
category of government as plaintiff without distinguishing among defend-
ants by party status. We included dummy variables for years to assess time 
patterns, with 2012 as the reference year. The sample contains decisions by 
170 different district court judges, and we clustered the standard errors by 
judge to account for the nonindependence of a judge’s decisions. We 
modeled fee denials separately for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed and 
cases in which defendants prevailed.  
Table 4 reports the regression results. It supports using separate models, 
as it shows that covariates often differ in size and significance based on the 
prevailing party. Models (1), (3), and (5) include only cases won by plaintiffs 
and models (2), (4), and (6) include only cases won by defendants. The 
defendant-win models cannot include the recovery or “claim fully accepted” 
variables as the recovery is always zero and the claim is never accepted. The 
table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
 
83 See generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMICS USING 
STATA 459-60 (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing logistic regression). 
84 Parties can be awarded fees even when not represented by counsel.  
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outcome variable. Marginal effects are interpretable as the change in the 
probability of a fee denial given a one-unit change in an explanatory 
variable. For categorical explanatory variables, this change in probability is 
in comparison to a reference category—that is, a value of the explanatory 
variable against which changes in the outcome probability are measured. 
The reference category for the plaintiff–defendant/prevailing–party combi-
nations, for example, is individual versus individual. This means that the 
coefficients for the other plaintiff–defendant/prevailing–party combinations 
in Table 4 indicate how much more or less likely a fee denial becomes 
compared to the baseline case of a suit between two individuals. Jerusalem 
is the reference category for judicial district in all four models. In models 
(1) and (2), tort is the reference category for case categories. 
Because Table 2 shows that tort cases are distinctive, we also constructed 
models limited to nontort cases to assess whether the large group of tort 
cases drives our results using the full sample. In models (3) and (4), which 
exclude tort cases, the reference case category is the residual category 
“other.” Model (5), which is limited to tort cases won by plaintiffs, shows 
that fees were less likely to be denied to individuals prevailing against 
corporations than to those prevailing against other individuals. Model (6), 
limited to tort cases won by defendants, confirms the favorable treatment of 
individuals: fees were least likely to be denied to individual defendants who 
won against corporations (denial in one of twelve cases).  
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression Models of Fee Denial to Winning Party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pltf. won, 
all case 
categories 
Deft. won, 
all case 
categories 
Pltf. 
won, 
nontort 
Deft. 
won, 
nontort 
Pltf. 
won, tort 
only 
Deft. won, 
tort only 
Recovery (log10) -0.032***  -0.030***  -0.009  
Claim fully 
accepted -0.212***  -0.139***  -0.011  
Years pending 
(log) -0.014 -0.009 -0.018 -0.004 0.006 -0.107 
Pltf. represented -0.181*** -0.010 -0.123** -0.013   
Deft. represented -0.107** -0.129* -0.096** -0.130*   
Administrative 
law 0.198 -0.088 0.106 -0.005   
Arbitration 0.197** -0.210*** 0.152* -0.154**   
Banking 0.239* -0.262*** 0.105 -0.231***   
Contract 0.144** -0.087** 0.085** -0.016   
Corporations 0.284*** -0.126** 0.192** -0.063   
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Expropriation 0.007 -0.038 -0.064 0.088   
Property 0.229*** -0.141*** 0.181*** -0.061   
Tort, auto -0.049 0.001     
Other 0.257** -0.113**     
Be’er-Sheva 0.041 -0.031 0.009 -0.027 0.050 0.192 
Haifa 0.058 -0.050 0.007 -0.023 0.015 -0.114 
Nazareth 0.183*** -0.101 0.155** -0.078 0.068 -0.059 
Petah Tikva -0.081** -0.063 -0.083** 0.007 -0.008 -0.230* 
Tel Aviv -0.013 -0.019 -0.024 0.045 -0.014 -0.185 
Ind. v. Corp. -0.073** -0.004 -0.032 -0.053 -0.124*** 0.082 
Ind. v. Govt. 0.148** 0.015 0.192*** -0.053 -0.014 0.113 
Corp. v. Ind. 0.014 -0.070 -0.030 -0.025 0.007 -0.296*** 
Corp. v. Corp. -0.032 -0.060 -0.055 -0.061 -0.023* -0.220* 
Corp. v. Govt. 0.035 0.022 0.134* 0.028  -0.145 
Govt. plaintiff 0.204** 0.014 0.184* -0.002  0.062 
Public corp. deft. 0.151** -0.045 0.074 -0.005 0.171  
Public corp. pltf. -0.004 -0.196*** 0.000 -0.158*** -0.015  
Foreign corp. pltf. -0.168*** 0.278* -0.143*** 0.218  0.180 
Foreign corp. def. 0.160 0.165 0.357** 0.054  0.337*** 
Case ended 2005 -0.013 0.085 -0.011 0.059 0.012 0.231** 
Case ended 2006 -0.020 0.008 -0.030 0.015 0.060 -0.038 
Case ended 2011 0.024 0.013 0.030 0.013 0.013 -0.006 
Observations 1485 1009 1256 790 230 219 
PRE 0.270 0.020 0.381 0.014 0.048 0.182 
Pseudo r-sq. 0.232 0.052 0.223 0.045 0.225 0.107 
Note: Dependent variable is whether winning party was denied attorneys’ fees. Standard errors, 
not shown in the interest of space, are clustered by judge. PRE equals proportionate reduction in 
error. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
In the first two plaintiff-win models ((1) and (3)), the size of recovery is 
negatively and significantly associated with fee denials. As damages in-
crease, defendants were more likely to be ordered to pay fees. The coeffi-
cient on “claim fully accepted” in model (1) indicates that full acceptance of 
a plaintiff ’s claim, in contrast with partial acceptance or denial of the claim, 
is strongly and statistically significantly associated with a court ordering 
payment of fees. Full acceptance of a claim decreases the probability of a 
litigation cost denial by 21% in model (1) and by 14% in the sample of 
nontort cases. This result can be interpreted as judges implementing RCP 
Rule 512’s instruction to consider the degree to which a prevailing party 
succeeded on its claims. An alternative measure of the degree of plaintiff 
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success is the ratio of monetary recovery to the amount requested in cases 
plaintiffs won. This variable is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with awarding fees but is substantially collinear (correlation 
coefficient > 0.50) with the recovery amount and is not included in the 
models. The presence of counsel for either plaintiff or defendant is associat-
ed with fees being awarded, but this effect is sizeable and significant only in 
the plaintiff win models. Neither the coefficients for time on the docket 
(years pending) nor those for the year dummy variables is significantly 
associated with fee denials in the models except for the tort case defendant-
win model for cases ending in 2005.  
1. Case Categories 
In model (1), the coefficients for all nontort case category dummy varia-
bles are positive and most are statistically significant, indicating a higher 
probability of fee denials when plaintiffs win nontort cases than when they 
win tort cases. The sole negative case category coefficient is for a subcatego-
ry of tort cases, those involving automobiles. Model (2) shows that when 
plaintiffs lost tort cases they tended not to be assessed their adversary’s fees. 
In model (2), all nontort case category coefficients are negative, and several 
are statistically significant. Model (4) shows that, excluding tort cases from 
the analysis, arbitration and banking cases were significantly less likely than 
the residual category (other) to deny fees.  
2. Plaintiff–Defendant Combinations 
When plaintiffs prevailed, the coefficients for the plaintiff–defendant 
combination variables were modest in model (1) with the exception of a 
significant 14.8% higher probability of fee denials when individual plaintiffs 
prevailed against governmental entities than when individuals prevailed 
against other individuals. This increased to 19.2% higher probability of 
denials when one excludes tort cases in model (3). The fact that the rate of 
fee denials is significantly lower when individuals prevailed against corpora-
tions is largely attributable to tort cases, since that effect shrinks to a 3.2% 
lower probability of denials that is insignificant when tort cases are excluded 
in model (3). The effect increases in magnitude to 12.4% and is significant in 
tort cases, as shown in model (5).  
When defendants prevailed in the full sample, public corporate plaintiffs 
that lost were least likely to be absolved of paying fees. This effect persisted 
at a substantial level, 15.8%, and was significant in nontort cases, as shown in 
model (4). There were no instances of denials of fees when a public corporate 
  
1646 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1619 
 
plaintiff lost a tort case and that variable dropped out of model (6); fees 
were allowed in all six such cases.  
Models (1) and (3) show that when foreign corporate plaintiffs prevailed 
they were significantly less likely to be denied fees than when domestic 
parties prevailed. This result is based on a substantial number of cases. In 
model (1), foreign corporate plaintiffs were denied fees in only three of sixty 
cases; in model (3), there were denials in only three of fifty-two cases. 
Model (3) also shows that when plaintiffs prevailed against foreign corpo-
rate defendants they were significantly more likely to be denied fees. This 
result is based on fee denials in four of fifteen cases. Model (6) shows that 
when foreign corporate defendants won, they were significantly more likely 
to be denied fees than when plaintiffs won against domestic defendants. The 
significant foreign corporate defendant effect in model (6) is based on 
denials in three of five cases. 
3. Districts 
All three models of cases with prevailing plaintiffs suggest that the Naz-
areth district court was more willing to deny fees in such cases than other 
district courts, though the significance levels varied. This is consistent with 
Table 3, which showed Nazareth to have the highest rate of fee denials in all 
four years. The significance of this effect did not persist in the tort model. 
The high Nazareth denial rate largely stems from a 70.5% fee denial rate in 
property cases won by plaintiffs, a rate much higher than that of any other 
district. The denial rate variation across districts is smaller in property cases 
won by defendants. The rate ranges from a high of 30.8% in Be’er Sheva and 
33.3% in Petah Tikva to a low of 16% in Nazareth. Petah Tikva’s denial rate 
for winning defendants in tort cases was the lowest of any district, 25% of 
twenty cases, much lower than all districts other than Tel Aviv, which 
denied fees in 29.3% of seventy-five cases. 
B. Amount of Fee Awards 
Since the amount of fee awards outcome is a continuous variable, one 
can, for cases won by plaintiffs, use scatterplots to show the relation be-
tween fee awards and other continuous variables. We first show the relevant 
scatterplots, which support using linear regression models, and then present 
tables that show the relations among fee awards and categorical variables.  
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the relation between fees and recoveries for 
the three major case categories: tort, contract, and property. Figure 1d shows 
the relation between fees and time on the docket for all cases combined. All 
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amounts in the figure and elsewhere in this Article are in 2012 NIS adjusted 
for inflation. The first three subfigures are traditional scatterplots, and 
Figure 1d shows both a scatterplot and the locally weighted regression 
(LOWESS) line85 that best fits the data. All of the subfigures show a 
positive relation with fees. As expected, courts tend to award higher fees 
when recoveries are higher and when cases take longer. The duration of 
cases served as our proxy for the effort lawyers expended.  
 
Figure 1: Relation Between Fees and Continuous Variables 
Note: Amounts are in 2012 NIS.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
Table 5 shows, by case category, the mean and median fee awards, and, 
in its last column, the median recovery. It shows similar median fee awards 
for plaintiffs and defendants in administrative law, arbitration, banking, 
contract, and property cases. Tort cases noticeably differ: mean fee awards 
to prevailing plaintiffs are more than double the mean fee awards to prevailing 
defendants, and median fee awards also substantially differ. In automobile 
tort cases, the difference was substantially more extreme. Although fees to 
 
85 See WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 18, 168-80 (rev. 
ed. 1994) (explaining the concept of a LOWESS line and its uses). 
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tort plaintiffs were the highest, median monetary recoveries for plaintiffs, 
shown in the last column, were higher in five of the ten case categories with 
median recovery data.  
Table 5: Fee Awards and Recovery Amounts, by Prevailing Party  
and Case Category 
 Defendant won Plaintiff won 
Category N with 
fee 
award 
Mean 
fee 
(000)  
Median 
fee (000)
N with 
fee award
Mean 
fee 
(000) 
Median 
fee (000) 
Median 
recovery 
(000) 
Admin. Law 15 73 30 9 83 30 1681 
Arbitration 26 19 12 14 8 8 NA 
Banking  21 64 40 15 50 36 1499 
Contract 161 53 35 193 110 35 1391 
Corporations 25 66 41 22 39 21 368 
Expropriation 7 46 18 16 40 33 96 
Property 153 41 23 175 37 20 152 
Tort  97 58 31 101 203 52 728 
Tort auto 13 21 18 68 231 175 1309 
Other  30 50 30 27 115 47 1932 
Total  548 49 25 640 110 31 874 
Note: Amounts are in thousands of 2012 NIS. The numbers of observations for the Median 
recovery column are fewer than the numbers shown in the table’s N columns due to cases with 
nonmonetary relief. Amounts exclude cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees 
may have been awarded to the losing party. The number of observations for the median recovery 
column differs from that number of observations shown for the fee awards.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
 
Table 6 shows mean and median fee awards for plaintiff wins and 
defendant wins, organized by district. Its last column shows the median 
recovery amounts in cases won by plaintiffs in which there was a monetary 
recovery. Mean fee awards were higher for prevailing plaintiffs than defend-
ants in all districts. Median fee awards were higher for prevailing plaintiffs 
than defendants in four districts, were equal between plaintiffs and defend-
ants in Tel Aviv, and were higher for prevailing defendants in Petah Tikva. 
Table 5 suggests that these differences are sensitive to the case category mix 
across districts, with tort cases being important in explaining the patterns. 
The differences in median fees across districts are statistically significant, as 
shown in the table's last row. 
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Table 6: Fee Award and Recovery Amounts, by District 
 Defendant won Plaintiff won 
Category 
N with 
fee 
award 
Mean 
fee 
(000) 
Median 
fee (000)
N with 
fee 
award 
Mean 
fee 
(000) 
Median 
fee (000) 
Median 
recovery 
(000) 
Be’er-Sheva 36 27 18 39 141 40 999 
Haifa 131 29 18 154 112 25 866 
Jerusalem 63 59 25 63 128 47 1121 
Nazareth  52 24 18 51 109 25 856 
Petah Tikva 51 70 50 67 94 35 1820 
Tel Aviv 214 64 41 246 111 41 1039 
Total 547 49 25 621 113 35 1004 
Significance - <0.001 <0.001 - 0.223 0.003 0.280 
Note: Amounts are in thousands of 2012 NIS. The numbers of observations for the Median 
recovery columns are fewer than the numbers shown in table’s N columns due to cases with 
nonmonetary relief. Amounts exclude cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees 
may have been awarded to the losing party. Significance levels for means are based on a regression 
model of the fee as a function of district with standard errors clustered by judge. Significance 
levels for medians are based on bootstrap quantile regressions.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
 
 Table 7 reports ordinary least squares regression results that model the 
fee award, in cases with an award, as a function of the variables in Figure 1, 
in Tables 5 and 6, and additional controls. Models (1) and (2) include all 
case categories, and models (3) to (8) are limited to specific case categories: 
tort, contract, and property. Models (1), (3), (5), and (7) are limited to cases 
won by plaintiffs and models (2), (4), (6), and (8) include only cases won by 
defendants. The recovery and “claim fully accepted” variables can be 
included only in the plaintiff-win models. Individual versus individual is the 
reference category for the plaintiff–defendant combinations. Jerusalem is 
the reference category for judicial district. Finally, in models (1) and (2), 
tort is the reference category for case categories. We again included dummy 
variables for years to assess time patterns, with 2012 as the reference year, 
and clustered the standard errors by judge to account for the non-
independence of decisions by the same judge. 
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Table 7: Regression Models of Fee Amounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pltf. won, 
all case 
categories 
Deft. won, 
all case 
categories
Pltf. 
won, 
tort 
Deft. 
won, 
tort 
Pltf. 
won, 
contract 
Deft. 
won, 
contract
Pltf. 
won, 
property 
Deft. 
won, 
property 
Recovery 
(log10) 
0.064***  0.113***  0.054***  0.040**  
Claim fully 
accepted 
0.019  0.013  0.060  0.024  
Years pending 
(log) 
0.153*** 0.084*** 0.267*** 0.078 0.073** 0.066 0.156*** 0.118*** 
Pltf. represent-
ed 
0.104 0.035   -0.031 0.214 0.050 0.078 
Deft. represent-
ed 
0.011 0.094   -0.061 0.127 0.076 -0.076 
Administrative 
law 
-0.361** 0.176       
Arbitration -0.359*** -0.241***       
Banking -0.252 -0.082       
Contract -0.135* 0.037       
Corporations -0.190* 0.159*       
Expropriation -0.326** 0.088       
Property -0.217*** 0.017       
Tort, auto 0.100 -0.192       
Other -0.053 -0.015       
Be’er-Sheva -0.068 -0.097 0.360 -0.417*** -0.109 -0.097 -0.164 -0.178 
Haifa -0.139* -0.141* -0.170 0.003 -0.058 -0.075 -0.127 -0.127 
Nazareth -0.055 -0.156** 0.346 -0.128 0.088 -0.269** -0.137 -0.129 
Petah Tikva -0.007 0.153* 0.212 0.213 -0.056 0.194 -0.032 0.111 
Tel Aviv -0.086 0.085 -0.189 0.245* 0.046 0.047 -0.045 0.037 
Ind. v. Corp. 0.098* 0.096* 0.197 -0.024 0.265** 0.081 -0.106 0.218** 
Ind. v. Govt. 0.071 -0.133*** -0.042 -0.284*** 0.387*** -0.371*** 0.019 -0.038 
Corp. v. Ind. -0.101** 0.101 -0.466** 0.107 0.117 0.059 -0.043 0.190 
Corp. v. Corp. 0.084 0.223*** -0.057 -0.004 0.189* 0.250*** 0.166* 0.375*** 
Corp. v. Govt. 0.192* 0.052 -0.305 -0.080 0.490*** 0.149 0.119 -0.108 
Govt. plaintiff -0.109 -0.075 -0.099 -0.337*** 0.011 -0.018 -0.044 0.097 
Public corp. 
deft. 
0.105 0.066 0.117 0.390** -0.053 -0.037 0.424*** 0.065 
Public corp. 
pltf. 
-0.045 0.031 0.135 0.004 -0.011 -0.045 -0.022 0.477 
Foreign corp. 
pltf. 
0.084 -0.008 0.638***  0.449  -0.096 -0.144 
Foreign corp. 
def. 
-0.257* 0.265 -0.305 0.206 -0.260 0.042 -0.227*  
Year=2005 -0.136** -0.020 -0.372** -0.011 -0.144 -0.084 0.069 0.048 
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Year=2006 -0.047 -0.021 -0.313* -0.124 -0.088 -0.014 0.100 -0.046 
Year=2011 -0.043 0.056 -0.107 -0.016 -0.116 0.059 -0.003 0.006 
Constant 4.352*** 4.188*** 4.205*** 4.342*** 4.341*** 4.103*** 4.116*** 4.242*** 
Observations 612 540 95 94 185 159 164 152 
R-squared 0.435 0.306 0.564 0.419 0.373 0.327 0.388 0.302 
Note: Dependent variable is the amount of the fee (log 10). Amounts exclude cases in which there 
was no defense and cases in which fees may have been awarded to the losing party. The plaintiff-
win models include cases that plaintiff won in which no fee was awarded. Such cases have the fee 
award recoded as zero (after the log transformation). Standard errors, not shown in the interest of 
space, are clustered by judge. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
 
All the plaintiff-win models confirm Figure 1’s associations between the 
amount of the fee and the amount of the recovery, as well as between the 
amount of the fee and the time a case was pending on the docket. The only 
non-significant coefficients for the years-pending variable are for defendant 
wins in tort and contract cases (models (4) and (6)), and those coefficients 
are in the expected direction. The coefficients are conservative because the 
models include cases that plaintiffs won in which no fee was awarded. Such 
cases have the fee award recoded as zero (after the log transformation). In 
models limited to cases with positive fee awards, the subset of cases shown 
in the figures, the relationships between the continuous explanatory varia-
bles and the fee amount are substantially stronger. Unlike the models of the 
existence of a fee award, the plaintiff ’s claim being fully accepted is not 
significantly associated with the amount of the fee award. This finding 
makes sense because the category “claim being fully accepted” provides no 
information about the amount of the recovery, which, as discussed above, is 
significantly associated with the amount of the fee award. 
1. Case Categories 
Model (1) confirms that fee awards tend to be higher in tort cases won 
by plaintiffs, as suggested by Table 5. The negative sign on all of the nontort 
case category variable coefficients indicates that tort, as the reference 
category, has the highest fee awards after controlling for other factors such 
as recovery amount, time on the docket, plaintiff–defendant combination, 
and district. The other nontort case categories in model (1) do not signifi-
cantly differ. Model (2) shows that the significantly higher fee awards in 
tort cases do not persist when defendants win. The low fee awards reflected 
by the coefficients for arbitration cases in both models (1) and (2) are likely 
attributable to those cases’ simplicity and shorter time on the docket. 
Arbitration cases were pending on average 1.9 years compared to 4.1 years 
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for other case categories. Arbitration cases are often simpler than other 
cases in that they do not address the merits of cases but rather procedural 
flaws in the arbitration.  
2. Plaintiff–Defendant Combinations 
With respect to the fact of an award, Table 4 showed favorable treatment 
of individuals who succeeded against corporations compared to individuals 
who succeeded against other individuals. Model (1) shows a marginally 
statistically significant effect for this party combination with respect to the 
amount of fees. Model (3) shows that corporations that prevailed against 
individual defendants in tort cases received significantly lower fee amounts 
than individuals who prevailed against individual defendants. In the con-
tract and property category-specific models of cases won by defendants, 
model (6) and (8), and in the pooled categories in model (2), fee awards 
were significantly higher for corporate defendants who prevailed against 
corporate plaintiffs. Model (5) indicates that, in contract cases won by 
plaintiffs, fee awards were highest against government defendants and the 
next highest when individual plaintiffs prevailed against corporations. These 
patterns of higher awards did not persist in contract cases won by defendants.86  
3. Districts 
In cases won by plaintiffs, all district coefficients in the full sample are at 
most marginally statistically significant, and one cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that they are jointly equal to zero. Model (2) shows that Petah Tikva had 
the highest fee awards when defendants won, as suggested by Table 6, and 
model (4) indicates that this is attributable to its high awards in tort cases 
(though Tel Aviv had higher defendant fee awards in tort cases). The higher 
awards are not attributable to cases that take longer. The median time on 
the docket in Petah Tikva tort cases is shorter than in any other district: 2.6 
years compared to about 4.2 years for other districts.  
In tort cases, a time trend exists for cases won by plaintiffs. Model (3) 
indicates that awards were lowest in 2005, higher in 2006 than in 2005, 
higher in 2011 than in 2006, and highest in 2012. However, no general 
increase in fee awards persisted across case categories.  
 
86 Model (3) in Table 7 suggests that when foreign corporate plaintiffs prevailed in tort cases, 
fee awards were significantly higher than in other cases. However, that estimate is based on only 
four cases won by such plaintiffs.  
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C. Scale Effect 
Table 8 shows the fee as a percentage of the recovery for each case category. 
The median fee percent in contract cases was much smaller than that in the 
two other major categories (tort and property). The existence of a common 
rate of 20% in tort is confirmed by the table, and the standard deviation of 
the fee percent in tort is substantially smaller than that in contract or 
property. The tort standard deviation significantly differs from the property 
standard deviation (p=0.021) but not from the contract standard deviation 
(p=0.203).87  
 
Table 8: Attorneys’ Fees as Percent of the Recovery, by Case Category 
Category Mean percent Median percent Std. dev.  N 
Administrative law 3.8 1.8 3.5 5 
Arbitration - - - 0 
Banking 8.9 2.8 11.9 9 
Contract 16.3 7.5 30.9 97 
Corporations 29.3 13.8 40.1 5 
Expropriation 59.3 20.5 63.7 11 
Property 25.8 13.5 38.7 36 
Tort 21.2 20.0 19.6 68 
Tort, auto 15.0 13.0 6.8 68 
Other 15.8 8.4 22.0 8 
Total 19.5 13.1 28.5 307 
Note: This table excludes cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have 
been awarded to the losing party.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
 
A natural question is whether attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the 
recovery decrease as the recovery increases. A decrease has been observed in 
U.S. class actions.88 But the fee and other dynamics of such litigation differ 
from the mass of cases, such as those studied here. If fees primarily reward 
effort, observing a declining fee percentage as the recovery increases is 
likely. Required effort may plateau in that the same effort may be needed to 
recover both an amount X and an amount substantially larger than X. The 
facts and law that must be marshaled likely do not always increase with the 
 
87 These significance levels are based on robust tests of the difference in the standard deviation 
of the means.  
88 See Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3, at 263-64 (explaining that the data revealed a 
scaling effect, or a fee percentage decrease as class recovery increases, in class actions). Our data 
contain 30 class actions, nine of which were won by plaintiffs, and three of which reported 
monetary recoveries. 
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stakes of a case. However, higher stakes may induce greater effort, which in 
turn may support a larger fee. Holding constant effort, does the fee decline 
or increase as a percent of recovery? Figure 2 shows the relationship be-
tween the percent and the recovery. The percent declines as the recovery 
increases, but the relation is absent in tort cases. 
 
Figure 2:  Fee Percent (logit)-Recovery Relation, by Case Category 
Recovery (log 10) 
Note: The logit transform is log(proportion/(1-proportion)) where “proportion” is the fee divided 
by the recovery. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
The regressions in Table 9 model the fee, as a percentage of the recov-
ery. They add to Figure 2’s information by controlling for effort through the 
case’s time on the docket. Time on the docket can be a problematic proxy 
for effort or complexity. A longer time can indicate manipulative procrasti-
nation on behalf of one of the parties (usually the defendant) or a heavy 
workload faced by the judge. Nevertheless, we expect that, on average, those 
cases that take longer require more effort. In addition, procrastination by 
defendants may require added effort by plaintiffs to seek orders requiring 
more expeditious action by defendants.  
Preliminary models, not reported here, included the full array of plain-
tiff–defendant combination variables, district variables, and other variables. 
They do not materially differ from the more parsimonious models in Table 
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9. Time on the docket behaves as expected and is positive in all models. The 
coefficient on recovery is consistently negative and is statistically significant 
in three models. The scale effect is strongest in contract and property cases, 
as suggested by Figure 2. The tendency to award fixed percentages in tort 
may preclude model (2) from achieving statistical significance. In fact, 
except for a few low-recovery/high-fee percent cases, the tort pattern in 
Figure 2 shows no scaling effect. An unvarying fee percent cannot of course 
decline as the recovery increases. 
 
Table 9: Regression Models of Fee as a Percent of the Recovery 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All case categories Tort cases Contract cases Property cases 
Recovery (log10) -0.956*** -0.338 -1.218*** -1.466*** 
Claim fully accepted -0.222* -0.186 -0.463* 0.093 
Years pending (log) 0.213*** 0.204 0.341* 0.296 
Administrative law -1.769***    
Banking -1.262***    
Contract -0.812**    
Corporations -0.693    
Expropriation -0.521    
Property -0.507**    
Tort, auto -0.042    
Other -0.548    
Constant 3.746*** 0.120 4.395*** 5.048* 
Observations 293 67 93 34 
R-squared 0.425 0.087 0.439 0.424 
Note: Dependent variable is a logit transform of the fee as a proportion of the recovery. Excludes 
cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have been awarded to the losing 
party. Standard errors, not reported here, are clustered on judge. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
V. DISCUSSION 
We discuss two major issues in more detail. First is the issue with direct 
implications for all legal systems. How does the Israeli system, with the 
internationally dominant loser-pays norm, compare to the American rule? 
Second, we discuss additional details of the system’s operation that should 
be of interest in fee studies. These details are the tendency to reward case 
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outcomes and effort and the system’s features relating to case category, 
locale, and party status.  
A. Loser Pays or Closer to the American Rule? 
A major issue for loser-pays systems is whether they fully compensate 
prevailing parties. Some believe that awarded fees are insufficient to cover 
clients’ actual attorneys’ fees.89 The 31,000 NIS median fee to plaintiffs and 
the 25,000 NIS median fee to defendants strongly support this perception. 
Quantitative comparison of fees with amounts related to litigation are 
striking. The 25,000 NIS median fee to defendants is approximately 1% of 
the jurisdictional amount threshold for filing a case in district court, and the 
plaintiff median is less than 2%. The plaintiff and defendant median fee 
awards are less than half of the filing fee, 62,500 NIS, for the smallest 
monetary claim (other than bodily injuries) that may be brought in district 
court. The loser-pays norm does not lead to full compensation of prevailing 
parties. 
Although Israeli prevailing parties do not, on average, recover their full 
litigation fees, it is unlikely that a single reason explains the shortfall. We 
find little evidence that judges seek to undercompensate prevailing parties 
by approving nonzero payments below known fees. When they wanted to 
promote access to courts, judges had the simpler strategy of denying the 
prevailing party any fees. Our data provide evidence that, in some case 
categories, judges try to award the prevailing party (mostly plaintiffs) actual 
attorneys’ fees. They did so in road accident claims when the plaintiff 
prevailed. In such cases judges know that, in all likelihood, the plaintiff paid 
his lawyer about 13% of the recovery as attorneys’ fees,90 and therefore they 
awarded the plaintiff 13% of the recovery as fees. The same phenomenon 
prevailed with regard to other tort claims in which judges appear to mimic 
the market and award prevailing plaintiffs fees of about 20% of the recovery 
(the routine retainer agreement in the market).91 In the four cases in which 
retainer agreements were submitted to the court, the requested fee amount 
was awarded.92 In the vast majority of cases, however, the judge lacked 
information about the prevailing party’s fees, and so one cannot expect 
awards to match the actual fees. Underestimation may be the norm to avoid 
 
89 See LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110 (“The legal fees ordered by the [Israeli] court are often 
considerably lower than the actual legal fees incurred by the parties.”). 
90 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
91 See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra 65 and accompanying text. 
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windfalls to parties and, in the case of prevailing defendants, to avoid over-
deterrence of litigation by parties with relatively low resources. 
The substantial fraction of cases in which prevailing parties received no 
fee increases the gap between winning parties’ fee expenditures and recov-
eries. This means that Israel’s loser-pays system, like many others, is not as 
different from the American rule as a simple dichotomy suggests.  
B. Further Perspectives on the System’s Operation 
Putting aside characterizing the system as most consistent with one rule 
or the other, Israel’s fee system has several salient features of national and 
transnational interest.  
The system in general rewards outcome and effort. The probability of 
denying fees to winning plaintiffs was inversely related to the size of 
recovery in cases won by plaintiffs and diminished when plaintiffs succeeded 
in whole. Fee denials were not associated with a case’s time on the docket, 
but the fee amount increased with both the size of the recovery and the time 
on the docket. The denial decision was more associated with whether 
plaintiffs fully prevailed than with the time that a case took. The denial 
decision differed substantially for cases won by plaintiffs and defendants. 
The fee system also has distinctive features relating to case category, 
locale, and party status. These include the prominent role of contingency 
fees in tort cases, the high rate of fee denials in Nazareth property cases, 
and the favorable fee award rate for foreign corporate plaintiffs. 
Fees in tort cases were one of the most distinctive features of the Israeli 
system. When one accounts for win rates, plaintiff–defendant combinations, 
and the amount of fees awarded, judges’ tendency to protect individual 
plaintiffs in tort cases becomes even clearer. Table 10 shows the sum of the 
fee award amounts in tort cases involving individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
won varying percentages of tort cases, as shown in the third column. They 
prevailed in 55% of tort cases against individuals, 62% of cases against 
corporations, and 19% of cases against the government. The sum of fees 
awarded to plaintiffs always far exceeded the sum of fees awarded to 
defendants, as shown in the fifth column. The percentage of fees paid to 
plaintiffs consistently exceeded their percentage of wins. Plaintiffs received 
90% of the fees in cases against individuals, 78.2% of the fees in cases 
against corporations, and 65.1% of the fees in cases against government 
entities. The last percentage is especially noteworthy because plaintiffs lost 
the overwhelming majority of cases against government defendants yet 
received almost two-thirds of the fees.  
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The dominance of contingent fees in tort cases likely led judges to rarely 
deny the fees when plaintiffs prevailed. The amounts judges awarded 
suggests that judges include a premium to reflect the risk of zero payment 
from a client when contingency lawyers lost. Both the high rate of granting 
fees to prevailing plaintiffs and the amount of fee awards likely relate to the 
contingency fee character of tort actions. Frequent denial of fees when tort 
defendants prevailed effectively promotes access to justice by individuals 
unlikely to be able to comfortably afford paying fees when they lose. 
 
Table 10: Tort Case Fee Awards by Party and Winner 
 Winner 
Parties’ win 
rates in 
cases with 
fee data 
Number of 
cases won 
with fee data 
Sum of fee 
awards 
(000) 
Percent of fee 
award amounts 
to plaintiffs 
Individual v. 
individual 
Pltf. 54.8 23 7672 90.0 
Individual v. 
individual 
Deft. 45.2 19 852  
Individual v. 
corporation 
Pltf. 61.7 37 8489 78.2 
Individual v. 
corporation 
Deft. 38.3 23 2363  
Individual v. 
government 
Pltf. 18.9 7 1051 65.1 
Individual v. 
government 
Deft. 81.1 30 563  
Note: This table excludes cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have 
been awarded to the losing party. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.  
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012. 
 
A second distinctive feature of the fee system was the high rate of fee 
denials in Nazareth property cases. Nazareth’s ethnic composition may lead 
to different kinds of property disputes than the typical disputes in other 
districts. Nazareth has a higher proportion of Arab litigants and judges than 
other districts. The higher rate of fee denials in Nazareth persisted across all 
ethnic combinations of plaintiffs and defendants. When plaintiffs won in 
cases involving individual plaintiffs and defendants, the Nazareth fee denial 
rate was 75% for the 32 cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Arab defendants, 
96% for the 25 cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Jewish defendants, and 
71% for the 14 cases involving Jewish plaintiffs and Jewish defendants. No 
Nazareth cases with the necessary information involved Jewish plaintiffs and 
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Arab defendants. Each of these rates is higher than the corresponding rate 
in Haifa, the only other district with substantial numbers of Arab property 
litigants. Together, Haifa and Nazareth account for 89% of Arab plaintiff–
Arab defendant cases and 77% of Arab plaintiff–Jewish defendant cases. For 
cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Jewish defendants won by plaintiffs, the 
Haifa fee denial rate was 14% (2 of 14 cases). The difference from the 96% 
Nazareth rate (p<0.001) is statistically significant. These results suggest the 
need to dig deeper into the cause and nature of the property disputes in Israel.  
A third notable result is the low rate of fee denials to foreign corporate 
plaintiffs, as shown in models (1) and (3) of Table 4. Such plaintiffs were 
denied fees in less than 15% of their wins. They were also highly successful 
in winning cases, as they prevailed in 69% of 13 contract actions, 83% of 42 
property actions, and 80% of 10 tort actions. Their rate of success against 
individual defendants was 92% of 36 cases compared to 67% of 173 cases 
brought by domestic corporations. Their rate of success against corporate 
defendants was 75% of 44 cases compared to 59% of 324 cases brought by 
domestic corporations. Since the decision to bring a case likely differs for 
potential plaintiffs in a foreign forum than for potential plaintiffs in their 
home country, we do not interpret these results as evidence that Israeli 
courts favor foreign corporations. Such anti-local bias seems extremely 
unlikely. A more plausible explanation is that foreign corporations, fearing 
bias in an unfamiliar court system, are selective about the cases that they 
bring in foreign countries and thereby achieve high win rates.93 Foreign 
corporate litigants likely also have higher than average resources and quality 
of lawyers.94 
As a procedural matter, the Israeli practice of not submitting documentation 
to inform the court about the time and effort spent on a case, despite the 
former ISC Presidents Justice Barak’s and Justice Beinisch’s administrative 
 
93 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American 
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1132-35 (1996) (explaining how data reflect the argument that 
foreigners are more selective of cases they file in U.S. courts). In the United States, findings of 
high foreign litigant success in one time period were not replicated in a later time period. See 
generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before 
and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441 (2007). 
94 The roster of names of foreign corporate plaintiffs in our data suggest that they often are 
large sophisticated international companies such as Audemars Piguet Holdings Ltd., Christian 
Dior Couture, Daimler Chrysler AG, Disney Enterprises Inc., E.M.I. Records Ltd., Gianni 
Versace S.P.A., Lloyd’s Underwriters, Levi Strauss & Co., Louis Vuitton Malletier, Microsoft 
Corp., Nike International Ltd., Smith Kline Beecham P.L.C., Time Warner Entertainment 
Company L.P., and Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC. We did not observe a similar high success 
rate by foreign corporate defendants, who, unlike plaintiffs, do not choose the cases in which they 
are involved. 
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guidance,95 at first seems bizarre. One assumes that a judge cannot make an 
appropriate fee award without information about time and effort. A possible 
explanation is rooted in an agency problem against the background of a 
lawyer cartel: fee awards are granted to the parties and not to the lawyers. 
Thus, the lawyers do not stand to benefit from revealing the information 
regarding actual fees and may even be adversely affected by such public 
knowledge. Alongside this explanation for the phenomenon, one can also 
justify the absence of documentation in light of the extra work it would add. 
If the prevailing party submits information in support of a fee amount, the 
losing party should be entitled to submit information in support of a 
different, presumably lower, fee amount (for example, to prove that the 
requested amount is not “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the 
litigation”).96 This could lead to a second round of litigation in many cases, 
with the dispute centered not on a case’s merits but instead on the appropri-
ate attorneys’ fees. Secondary litigation became such a serious and costly 
issue in litigation in England that a fee award table, based on the amount 
recovered, was adopted to reduce fee litigation.97 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney compensation fuels litigation, yet surprisingly little systematic 
knowledge exists about fee awards. Legal systems try to balance the desire 
to hold prevailing parties harmless through fee awards while promoting 
reasonable access to courts by not overly deterring reasonable claims. 
English rule systems do this through exceptions to loser-pays rules and 
through fee awards that do not cover the prevailing party’s actual fees. We 
present evidence that Israeli judges usually awarded fees to prevailing 
parties, often exercised their discretion to deny fees, and denied fees at the 
highest rate in tort cases brought by individuals. Higher recoveries and 
prevailing in whole were both associated with an increased probability of a 
fee award. The loser-pays norm was not followed in property cases in 
Nazareth, where fee denial to prevailing plaintiffs was the norm. 
When fees were awarded, the median amount was equivalent to less than 
$10,000. Prevailing parties thus usually do not receive their full litigation 
fees and must pay their attorneys substantial amounts above the court 
awarded fees. A loser-pays system with substantial rates of fee denials to 
 
95 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
96 See CA 6793/08 Loare Ltd. v. Meshulam Levinshtein Contracting & Eng’g Ltd. 1, 10 
[2009] (Isr.). 
97 See Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 534 (“The Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme (FRCS) 
was itself a response to a growing concern about rising legal costs in England and Wales . . . .”). 
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prevailing parties and low fee amounts when fees are rewarded may, in its 
actual operation, be closer to the American rule than to the English rule. 
Both the pattern of fee denials and the amount of fee awards in tort cases 
suggest that judges took into account that contingency fees were the 
common method for funding tort litigation. Tort, contract, and property 
cases all showed a strong association between the size of the recovery and 
the amount of the fee award. Outside of tort, where fixed percentages of 
fees were the norm, fees declined as a percent of the recovery as the recovery 
amount increased.  
 
